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Abstract: 
 
Budgets can be used for many different purposes, such as for planning, coordination, 
motivation and performance evaluation. In this paper we argue that the intensity of use 
for different purposes depends on the quality of the budget estimate, i.e., the level of 
slack in the budget. When slack is higher, intensity of budget use is lower. 
Based on survey evidence from 44 Dutch listed firms, we find that firms’ level of 
budget participation, ability to detect slack and budget emphasis all have a negative 
impact on their budgetary slack level, while perceived environmental uncertainty has a 
positive impact. Also, we find that budgetary slack indeed leads to less budget use for 
three purposes:   planning/communication,   coordination/allocation   and    
evaluation/rewarding. These effects are much weaker when we use purposefully 
incorporated slack in our model, instead of overall slack. Finally, we also find that the 
impact of slack on satisfaction with the budgeting system runs indirectly via the 
purposes of budget use. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of budgets still triggers an important debate in the management 
accounting literature (Covaleski et al., 2003). Where some argue that the 
budgeting process is time and cost consuming, leads to rigidity and short-
termism, and provides little added value to increase company performance 
(e.g., Neely et al., 2001), others find budgeting an indistinguishable part of 
the planning process of firms when the budgets are used properly (e.g., 
Covaleski et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2007). 
Recently, Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) examined for which purposes 
budgets are used in practice, and found that antecedents and consequences of 
reasons to budget differ. In this paper, we argue that the purposes for which 
budgets are used depend on the quality of the budget information signal. The 
normative literature specifies that for motivation and performance evaluation 
purposes targets should be challenging and therefore budgetary slack needs to 
be low, whereas for planning and coordination purposes more slack is 
allowed.1 Since most firms use the same budget for multiple purposes, they 
have to compromise on the slack level they allow (Merchant and Manzoni, 
1989). One important decision in performance management, therefore, is 
“how to choose a target that either suits the primary purpose of budgeting or 
provides a reasonable compromise between the planning and motivational 
purposes” (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007, p. 335). Hansen et al. (2003) 
also argue that little is known about how the different guidelines with respect 
to the optimal slack level for different purposes of budget use interact 
together. Further, Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) suggest that more 
research is needed to understand how firms choose their multiple reasons to 
budget when circumstances of each individual reason are incompatible. 
The main contribution of our paper is that we examine the relationship 
between the outcome of the budgeting process, i.e., the budgetary slack level, 
and the functions for which the budget is used. Prior research mainly 
examines slack as an outcome variable, whereas we argue that the slack level 
impacts the purposes for which the budget will be used. Further, we examine 
budget use at the corporate level and not at the business unit level, as done by 
Hansen and Van der Stede (2004). This focus on a higher organizational level 
leads to additional purposes for which firms use budgets, such as for resource 
allocation and to authorize spending. Finally, we distinguish between overall 
and purposeful slack. Recently, studies have documented the beneficial 
impact of budgetary slack on managerial behavior (Van der Stede, 2000; 
Davila and Wouters, 2005). Therefore, we also examine whether the impact 
of slack on the purposes for which budgets are used, depends on whether 
slack is purposeful or not. 
To test these assertions, we develop a structural model and use Partial Least 
Squares (PLS) to estimate this model. First, we assess which factors influence 
the level of slack. Next, we argue that the extent to which budgets are used for 
various purposes depends on the slack level, and test whether this is indeed 
the case. Finally, we analyze the relationship between the degree of budget 
use for different purposes and the level of satisfaction with the budgeting 
system. 
From the empirical analysis we find that firms’ level of budget participation, 
ability to detect slack and budget emphasis all have a negative impact on their 
budgetary slack level. Firms that face more environmental uncertainty have 
more slack in their budgets. We also find that in our sample the budget is used 
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for three different purposes. These are 1) planning and communication, 2) 
coordination and allocation, and 3) evaluation and rewarding. Further, the 
results show that slack has a negative impact on the degree of budget use for 
all three purposes. This effect is less strong when the slack in the budgets is 
purposefully built in during the budgeting process. Finally, we find that slack 
has an indirect negative effect, via the purposes of budget use, on budgeting 
system satisfaction, but no direct effect. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the 
literature and builds the structural model we test in this paper. Section three 
discusses the data collection, measurement instruments and statistical 
techniques used. Section four presents the results of the empirical analysis. 
Finally, section five discusses the most important results and summarizes the 
paper. 
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section we build our structural model (see Figure 1). 
       
 
Figure 1: Structural model tested in the paper 
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 First, we describe the different purposes for which budgets can be used. Then 
we discuss the relationship between several budgeting and environmental 
factors, and slack. Next, we explain why the level of slack influences the 
different purposes of budget use. Finally, we discuss how slack has both a 
direct and an indirect effect (via the purposes of budget use) on satisfaction 
with the budgeting system. 
 
 
 
Use of budgets 
 
 Although many sources argue that budgets are used for multiple purposes 
(Covaleski et al., 2003; Horngren et al., 2003), only recently empirical 
evidence about these different purposes has become available.2 In their review 
paper, Covaleski et al. (2003) identify as purposes for which budgets are used, 
planning and coordination of organizational activities, allocation of resources, 
motivating employees, and expressing conformity with social norms. 
Similarly, Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) argue that budgets are used for 
planning, coordination, motivation and top management oversight. 
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 Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) are the first that have intensively examined, 
based on discussions with practitioners, for which reasons budgets are used in 
practice. From these discussions they conclude that purposes of budget use 
are a) operational planning, b) performance evaluation, c) communication of 
goals, and d) strategy formulation. Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) find in 
an exploratory factor analysis that these four purposes load on one factor, but 
argue that they are different enough to analyze them separately. Based on 
these purposes, they examine what the antecedents and consequences of these 
four different types of budget use are. As Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) 
argue, this approach leads to a “practice defined” variable (Luft and Shields, 
2003), but they suggest that a better approach is non-existent, because the 
number of different types of use is potentially unlimited.  More specific, 
purposes of use might depend on the hierarchical level at which budgets are 
used. Hansen and Van der Stede (2004), who discuss the use of budgets at the 
business unit level, specifically state that at a higher organizational level other 
purposes of budget use could be identified, such as using budgets for resource 
allocation and authorization of spending. 
 In this paper, our level of analysis is the top management level whereas 
Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) gathered data at the business unit level. 
This might lead to slightly different purposes of budgeting. Based on 
exploratory factor analysis on 10 items (see measures section), we identify 
three different purposes of budget use at the top management level. These 
purposes are 1) the extent to which budgets are used for planning and 
communication, 2) the extent to which budgets are used for coordination and 
allocation, and 3) the extent to which budgets are used for evaluation and 
rewarding. The planning and communication purpose is the ex ante use of 
budgets to translate the long-term strategic plan of the firm into a short-term 
plan (i.e., the budget) and to communicate their contents to the employees. 
This purpose also includes the strength of the link between the budget and the 
strategy. When the budget has a strong link with the strategy of the firm, this 
reinforces the impression by subordinates that the followed strategy is a plan 
that should be followed by all employees (Simons, 2000). With a closely 
linked budget, employees are able to assess decisions in the context of the 
firm’s strategy. In addition, such budgets are able to communicate the strategy 
to employees.3 The coordination and allocation purpose is the use of budgets 
to allocate resources needed between organizational units, to coordinate 
activities, and to authorize spending. This factor is distinctively different from 
the purposes of budget use identified by Hansen and Van der Stede (2004), 
and represents the fact that the level of analysis in our study is the corporate 
level. As Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) discuss, this factor leads to 
sharing of information both vertically, where top managers state priorities and 
subordinates identify opportunities and risks to top managers, and 
horizontally, between different organizational units. The evaluation and 
rewarding purpose is the ex post use of budgets to evaluate the extent to 
which the initial plans were met, and to reward employees for their 
achievements. This includes activities such as evaluation of both activities 
and employees, and motivating and rewarding employees. 
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Antecedents of budgetary slack 
 
 Before explaining why the slack level has an impact on the purposes for 
which budgets will be used, we will first discuss a number of antecedents of 
budgetary slack.4 There is a considerable literature that discusses antecedents 
of slack (see Dunk and Nouri, 1998, for an overview). In this paper we focus 
on three important budgeting characteristics that influence slack, being the 
level of budget participation, ability to detect slack, and budget emphasis. In 
addition, we explore the impact of perceived environmental uncertainty. 
 Participation in the budgeting process can have two differential types of 
impact on slack. First, letting managers participate in the budget negotiation 
process provides them with the opportunity to raise slack (Schiff and Lewin, 
1970; Lukka, 1988). Empirical evidence for this effect is found in Lowe and 
Shaw (1968) and Schiff and Lewin (1970). In contrast, participation is also 
argued to have a negative impact on slack because it leads to information 
sharing between the superior and subordinate, and therefore to more reliable 
budget levels (Onsi, 1973; Cammann, 1976). Empirical evidence for this 
negative relationship is found, among others, in Merchant (1985) and Lal et 
al. (1996). Together these two contrasting effects lead Dunk and Nouri (1998) 
to the conclusion that participation is a necessary condition for slack, but not 
a sufficient one. Considering these arguments, we state our hypothesis in the 
null-form, i.e.,  
  
 H1: Budget participation is not related to budgetary slack. 
 
 The ability of top management to detect slack has a negative impact on the 
level of slack (Onsi, 1973). Ability to detect slack is a function of the quality 
of information systems, the information asymmetry between subordinates and 
superiors, and the predictability of tasks (Merchant, 1985). Empirical 
evidence for this negative relationship is found in Merchant (1985).  
Therefore, we expect that; 
  
 H2: Ability to detect slack is negatively related to budgetary slack. 
 
 Budget emphasis also has a contingent impact on slack (Van der Stede, 2001). 
First, increasing the emphasis on budgetary controls increases the risk for 
managers of negative consequences when they do not reach their budget 
targets. This will lead to increased incentives for managers to create slack 
(Van der Stede, 2001). Empirical evidence for this effect is found in Lal et al. 
(1996), and partly in Merchant (1985). Second, budget emphasis can reduce 
the propensity to build slack over time because of negative reputation effects 
when managers meet their budget each year, which indicates that they 
negotiate for slack (Van der Stede, 2001; Webb, 2002). Empirical evidence 
for this negative relationship between budget emphasis and slack is found in 
Dunk (1993) and Van der Stede (2000). Considering this differential impact, 
we state our hypothesis in the null-form, i.e., 
  
 H3: Budget emphasis is not related to budgetary slack. 
 
 Finally, Merchant (1985) argues that slack can be used to absorb uncertainty 
in the environment, suggesting a positive relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and the level of slack. He finds empirical evidence for this 
conjecture in a survey of 170 US managers from 19 firms. Indjejikian and 
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Matejka (2006) argue that perceived environmental uncertainty is a proxy for 
information asymmetry and also expect a positive association. They find, 
however, no significant relationship in their data. Together, we expect that, 
  
 H4: Perceived environmental uncertainty is positively related to budgetary 
slack. 
 
 
 
Impact of budgetary slack on budget use 
  
 Budgetary slack can be caused by many factors, such as imperfect forecast 
models and a difference between individual and organizational goals (Walker 
and Johnson, 1999). Both unreliable forecast models and goal incongruence 
lead to biased information that feeds the budgeting process (Otley, 1985; 
Lukka, 1988). The level of bias influences the usability of the budget for 
different control purposes. Shank and Govindarajan (1993), for example, 
argue that performance evaluation presupposes the establishment of accurate 
standards. When slack in budgets is high, they provide no accurate targets. 
 The quality of a performance measure therefore influences its fit for using it 
in the control system. We argue that the outcome of the budgeting process, 
i.e., the level of slack in the budget, is an indication for the level of bias in the 
performance measure and therefore for the quality of the signal. This is 
associated with the usability of the budget for different purposes. If the 
performance measure is more biased, that is it incorporates more slack, in 
general this will make the measure less fit for using it for a number of 
purposes. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis5; 
  
 H5: Budgetary slack is negatively related to the use of the budget for a) 
planning and communication, b) coordination and allocation, and c) 
evaluation and rewarding. 
  
 The impact of the level of slack on the usefulness of budgets for different 
purposes might vary, however (Barrett and Fraser, 1977; Otley, 1982; 
Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). One 
solution is that firms use different budgets for different purposes. Hopwood 
(1974), for example, suggests that top managers provide difficult to achieve 
budget targets to managers, while they have a different budget plan for 
planning and coordination purposes in their drawers with targets that 
incorporate more slack. There is some evidence, however, that firms hardly 
use different budgets for different purposes (Umapathy, 1987; Merchant and 
Manzoni, 1989), and that firms therefore compromise on the slack level. For 
example, Merchant and Manzoni (1989) find in their sample of 12 firms, that 
all 54 profit centers studied use the same budget for motivation and planning 
purposes. In addition, Umapathy (1987) documents that in the US only 7% of 
firms use multiple budgets for different purposes. This raises the question 
how firms set the optimum slack level for their budgets, or how, given the 
level of slack, they use their budgets for different purposes. 
 First, psychological literature unambiguously finds that challenging targets 
with little slack are optimal in providing managers motivation (Locke and 
Latham, 2002). This suggests that a biased signal, i.e., a budget with much 
slack, makes it less valuable for motivational purposes. Although numbers 
differ somewhat, most research finds that, with respect to this guideline, it 
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would be optimal if budgets would be reached somewhere between 25% and 
40% of time (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Merchant and Manzoni 
(1989), however, find that for many reasons, such as to protect autonomy, to 
increase predictability of earnings, to reduce risk of losing goal commitment, 
and to reduce the need for intervention, firms often set more achievable 
targets. This opinion is corroborated by Fisher et al. (2003), who find that in 
the context of group budgets moderately difficult budgets lead to the highest 
motivation of workers. 
 Some argue that using budgets for planning and coordination purposes 
requires that budget levels should represent management’s best guess, 
meaning that slack will be moderate and that budgets on average are reached 
50% of time (Barrett and Fraser, 1977; Merchant and Manzoni, 1989). In 
contrast, Otley and Berry (1979) find that when budgets at lower 
organizational levels are aggregated to a higher level, the probability to 
achieve the aggregate higher level budget is much lower than that of the 
individual disaggregate lower level budgets. This suggests that at the 
corporate level a moderate level of slack is needed to be able to set achievable 
budget levels at lower levels. In addition, for reasons of facilitating 
discussions between managers of different organizational units that are highly 
interdependent, some slack is needed to let managers focus on optimal 
decisions for the firm and not on decisions that are optimal for their own 
organizational unit (Lillis, 2002).  Finally, in an experiment Fisher et al. 
(2003) also find that moderately difficult targets lead to the best performing 
budgets for coordination purposes, because variability in performance is 
lowest. 
 In sum, based on psychological theory we could expect that the negative 
impact of slack on budget use is stronger for the evaluation/rewarding 
purpose than for the planning/communication and coordination/allocation 
purposes. The arguments from Merchant and Manzoni (1989) are, however, 
contrasting this expectation. Therefore, because theory to predict differences 
between the strength in association between slack and the different purposes 
of budget use is not strong enough, we do not state formal hypotheses, but 
examine this issue exploratory.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Budgetary slack, use of budgets and budgeting system satisfaction 
  
 In the IT-literature many studies have examined the relationship between 
usage of information systems and user satisfaction (see DeLone and McLean, 
1992, for an overview). In general, these studies have found this relationship 
to be positive. To our knowledge, Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) is the 
only budgeting study that has examined a similar relationship. They found 
that when the performance of each reason to budget increases, this has a 
positive influence on overall satisfaction with the budget. Therefore, we 
expect that; 
  
 H6: The use of the budget for a) planning and communication, b) coordination 
and allocation, and c) evaluation and rewarding is positively related to 
budgeting system satisfaction. 
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 To our knowledge no studies are available that document the relationship 
between the level of slack and budgeting system satisfaction. As more slack 
implies a lower quality of the budget information signal, to the extent that 
there is a direct relationship between budgetary slack and budgeting system 
satisfaction, we expect it to be negative. We argue, however, that when slack 
is high, firms will adjust the intensity of budget use and, for example, choose 
alternative control mechanisms for these purposes. We therefore expect that 
the impact of slack on budgeting system satisfaction is at least partially 
mediated by the purposes of budget use. Therefore, we expect that; 
  
 H7: Budgetary slack is negatively related to budgeting system satisfaction. 
 H8: The relation between budgetary slack and budgeting system satisfaction is 
mediated by the use of the budget for a) planning and communication, b) 
coordination and allocation, and c) evaluation and rewarding. 
 
 
 
Impact of purposeful slack on budget use 
  
 Although slack has a negative connotation, there are many reasons why firms 
build slack in their budgets. Davila and Wouters (2005), for example, find 
that firms purposefully incorporate slack in their budgets to facilitate growth 
and to indicate to managers that other performance dimensions, such as 
service quality, are important. Similarly, Van der Stede (2000) finds that a 
higher slack level leads to a longer time orientation of managers. Together 
these arguments imply that when firms purposefully incorporate slack in their 
budgets, this does not need to have an adversary impact on budget use. We 
therefore also estimate our structural model (see Figure 1) with a measure for 
purposeful slack instead of the (overall) slack variable. We expect the 
association between slack and budget use to be less negative if slack is of the 
purposeful type. In addition, provided the discussion above, purposeful slack 
is incorporated into budgets, among others, to facilitate growth and to stress 
other important performance dimensions. Therefore, we expect that 
traditional antecedents, such as budget participation and budget emphasis, 
have less impact on purposeful slack.  Finally, when slack is purposefully 
incorporated into the budget, we expect that it has no (direct or indirect) 
impact on satisfaction with the budgeting system. 
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III.  METHOD  
  
 This section discusses the sample and data collection, measurement 
instruments and statistical techniques used. 
 
 
 
Sample and data collection 
  
 In Fall 2006, a survey study was conducted on operational budgeting 
practices among Dutch manufacturing, trade and service (including financial 
services) firms that are listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.7 In total, the 
chief financial officers (CFOs) of 134 firms were sent a six-page 
questionnaire, a personalized cover letter, and a stamped return envelope. 
CFOs were chosen as informants as they are knowledgeable about firm’s 
operational budgeting practices at the corporate level. Four weeks later, the 
non-respondents were sent a reminder with a new questionnaire. In total, 44 
questionnaires were returned. Therefore, the total realized response rate was 
32.8%. To investigate the possibility of non-response bias, we compared the 
respondents to the non-respondents in terms of firm size (net sales) and sector 
representation. The results show that the firms that responded are somewhat 
larger but from similar sectors than the firms that did not respond. 8 Given the 
rather small sample we use mean imputation for missing values. All analyses 
are based on this imputation. The maximum number of missing values for an 
item is 4. To test whether the missing values were missing completely at 
random (MCAR), we performed Little’s MCAR test, which was not 
significant (χ2=274.169, df=271, p>0.43). This implies that the imputation 
method has no impact on the results, and therefore any imputation method can 
be used (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
 
 
Measures 
  
 In this section we test the reliability and validity of our constructs. We test the 
dimensionality of constructs through factor analysis. In appendix B the factor 
loadings of all items are reported.  In appendix A the complete measurement 
instruments are reported. 
 Consistent with Hansen and Van der Stede (2004), Budget participation 
(BU_PARTIC) is measured through a one-item instrument. Respondents were 
asked, on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very great 
extent), to rate the extent to which the managers of the business units in their 
firm participate in setting their unit’s targets. In this item, taken from Hansen 
and Van der Stede (2004), we replaced the term unit manager by “managers 
of the business units” to reflect our different level of analysis. To test the 
construct’s criterion-related validity, we compared the averages of budget 
participation in two groups, based upon an additional question in which we 
asked respondents which of two statements best described the target setting 
process in their budgeting system. The statements were 1) top management 
develops the targets, presents them for noncommittal advise to the lower 
levels, and then sets them, or 2) managers develop the targets for their own 
areas of interest, which then (maybe revised) are set by top management. The 
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average budget participation scores were 3.6 in group 1 and 4.4 in group 2, 
and significantly different from each other (t=-3.014, p<0.01). 
 Ability to detect slack (BU_DETABIL) was measured using an instrument 
developed by Onsi (1973), and used by Merchant (1985) and Lal et al. (1996). 
Respondents were asked, on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), to indicate the extent to which they agree with 
three statements with regard to the ability of the top management of their firm 
to detect slack in the budgets of the business units. The three items load on 
one factor that explains 56% of the variance. Cronbach alpha of the construct 
is 0.59. 
 Budget emphasis (BU_EMPHASIS) was measured using an instrument 
developed by Hansen and Van der Stede (2004). Respondents were asked, on 
a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), to 
indicate the extent to which they agree with four statements with regard to the 
importance of meeting targets by the managers of the business units in their 
firm. Factor analysis reveals that one dimension explains 53% of the variance 
in the four items, which has a Cronbach alpha of 0.70. 
 Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) was measured using an 
instrument developed by Govindarajan (1984) and Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984), and adapted by Hoque (2004). Respondents were asked, on a five-
point scale ranging from 1 (very predictable) to 5 (very unpredictable), to 
indicate their perceptions of the predictability of eight elements of the firm’s 
external environment during the last five years. Since the instrument is a 
typical example of a construct with formative indicators (Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer, 2001), we do not factor analyze the construct. Firms can face 
high uncertainty among any of the areas in the items, but do not necessarily 
have to score high on all items. Items therefore do not need to covary. This 
implies that reliability and validity tests are meaningless with formative 
indicators (e.g., Bisbe et al., forthcoming). Although PLS is able to 
incorporate formative indicators in the model (Chin, 1998a), we handle this 
variable as a one-dimensional construct measured by a summated scale in the 
reported results because of power considerations.9 
 Budgetary slack (BU_SLACK) was measured through a slightly adapted five-
item scale developed by Van der Stede (2000). First, respondents were asked, 
on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 
to indicate the extent to which they agree with four statements with regard to 
the role of targets in their firm’s budgeting system. Next, the respondents 
were asked, on a fully-anchored, five-point (reverse coded) scale, how they in 
general would characterize the targets that are used in the preparation of the 
operational budgets in their firm, where 1 = very easily attainable; 2 = 
attainable under normal circumstances; 3 = attainable with some extra effort; 
4 = attainable with much extra effort; and 5 = attainable only under ideal 
circumstances. Factor analysis indicates that this construct represents one 
dimension that explains 47% of the variance. The construct’s Cronbach alpha 
is 0.68.10 
 As we are also interested in the impact of purposeful slack on budget use, we 
also included a one-item instrument measuring purposeful slack 
(BU_PURPSLACK) in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked, on a five-
point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always), to rate the frequency with 
which top management in their firm consciously allows slack in the budgets 
of the business units. 
 Budget purposes of use were measured using a list of nine widely used 
purposes of using budgets, and a separate question about the strength of the 
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link between the budget and firms’ strategy. These purposes include most of 
the purposes identified by Hansen and Van der Stede (2004), i.e., planning, 
communication and performance evaluation, but are extended with 
coordination, resource allocation and authorizing spending. Respondents were 
asked to rate, on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very 
great extent), the extent to which operational budgets in their firm play a role 
for each of the nine functions. Most firms use their budget for all studied 
purposes to at least some extent. The budgeting-strategy link was measured 
using a one-item instrument taken from Hansen and Van der Stede (2004). 
Respondents were asked, on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(to a very great extent), to rate the extent to which their firm’s current 
operational budget supports their firm’s strategy. Factor analysis on these 10 
items reveals three dimensions which we label “planning and 
communication” (BU_PLAN/COM), “coordination and allocation” 
(BU_COORD/ALL) and “evaluation and rewarding” (BU_EVAL/REW). The 
evaluation/rewarding dimension explains 44% of the variance and has a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.77. The coordination/allocation dimension explains 12% 
above the first factor, and has a Cronbach alpha of 0.87. The 
planning/communication dimension explains 11% above the first two factors, 
and has a Cronbach alpha of 0.57. 
 Budgeting system satisfaction (BU_SATISF) was also measured using a one-
item instrument, asking respondents to rate, on a five-point scale ranging from 
1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied), the extent to which the top 
management of their firm is satisfied with the current budgeting system. 
 To assess the extent of common method bias, we executed Harman’s single-
factor test. The first factor explained only 25% of all variance in the items, 
well below the guideline that common method bias is severe when the 
majority of variance in all items is explained by the first factor (Podsakoff and 
Organ, 1986). 
 
 
 
Partial least squares 
  
 We use Partial Least Squares (PLS) to estimate our models. PLS is well 
suited for cases where sample size is small and is quite robust with respect to 
various potential deficiencies in the model specification, such as 
multicollinearity and skewed distributions (Cassel et al., 2000). Because the 
number of missing values was limited and equally divided over the variables, 
we report results with mean imputation. Re-analyzing the models without the 
observations with missing values leads to similar results, however. We used 
SmartPLS (version 2.0) for our analysis (Ringle et al., 2005), and t-values of 
coefficients are computed with bootstrapping (n=500). 
 Loadings of all items from the measurement model are reported in Appendix 
C. In addition, we report the average variance extracted (AVE) of each 
construct and compare this with squared correlations between all variables. 
AVE’s ranged between 0.46 and 0.79, which is higher than all squared 
correlations between constructs, indicating that the constructs have sufficient 
discriminating validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
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IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
 The descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 1 and 2. We calculated the Pearson correlation coefficients using 
variable scores based on the average item scores for the multi-item 
instruments. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N=44) 
 
 mean median SD Min Max 
BU_PARTIC  4.09 4.00 0.88 1 5 
BU_DETABIL  3.52 3.67 0.68 1 4.67 
BU_EMPHASIS  3.48 3.50 0.57 1.50 4.75 
PEU  2.70 2.75 0.36 2 3.57 
BU_SLACK  2.30 2.20 0.53 1.4 4.4 
BU_PURPSLACK 2.27 2.00 0.65 1 4 
BU_PLAN/COM 3.85 3.83 0.62 1.67 5 
BU_COORD/ALL  3.69 4.00 0.88 1 5 
BU_EVAL/REW  4.00 4.00 0.61 2.25 5 
BU_SATISF  3.66 4.00 0.67 2 5 
 
 
Table 2: Pearson correlation coefficients (N=44) 
 
 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1.BU_PARTIC 
 
1.000         
2.BU_DETABIL 
 
0.411** 1.000        
3.BU_EMPHASIS 
 
0.335** 0.497** 1.000       
4.PEU 
 
-0.091 0.063 -0.118 1.000      
5.BU_SLACK 
 
-0.542** -0.530** -0.513** 0.319** 1.000     
6.BU_PURPSLACK  
 
-0.268* -0.335** -0.243 -0.043 0.320** 1.000    
7. BU_PLAN/COM 
 
0.379** 0.421** 0.387** -0.262* -0.621** -0.186 1.000   
8. BU_COORD/ALL 
 
0.508** 
 
0.342** 0.230 -0.140 -0.507** -0.365** 0.482** 1.000  
9. BU_EVAL/REW 
 
0.433** 0.313** 0.293* -0.138 -0.434** -0.288* 0.468** 0.542** 1.000 
10. BU_SATISF 
 
0.473** 0.443** 0.267* -0.270* -0.385** -0.188 0.495** 0.445** 0.470** 
*,** indicates significance at the 10% or 5% level (two-tailed). 
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 The reported level of slack is, on average, not very high in the sample, 2.30 
on a 1 to 5 scale. In general, firms also do not purposefully incorporate a high 
level of slack into the budgets (2.27). We also asked for which reasons 
purposeful slack is incorporated in the budget (multiple answers possible). Of 
the 42 responses, 31 answered “to be able to absorb environmental 
uncertainty”, 22 answered “to make long-term growth possible, even if this 
harms short-term performance”, 18 answered “to stimulate managers of 
business units to carry out innovations”, 14 answered “to stimulate other 
goals next to financial performance (e.g., customer satisfaction, quality)”, 9 
answered “to realize a long-term orientation of managers”, and 8 answered 
“to relax cooperation between diverse business units that have mutual 
relations”. 
 The correlation between slack and purposeful slack is 0.320 (p<0.05), 
indicating that much slack from the budgeting process is non-purposeful. 
Consistent with Shields and Shields (1998) and Hansen and Van der Stede 
(2004), we find that the different purposes for using budgets are correlated. 
This is r=0.482 (p<0.01) between planning/communication and 
coordination/allocation, r=0.468 (p<0.01) between planning/communication 
and evaluation/rewarding, and r=0.542, (p<0.01) between 
coordination/allocation and evaluation/rewarding. Finally, satisfaction with 
the budgeting system is lower when slack is higher (r=-0.385, p<0.01), but 
this effect is less strong when slack is purposefully build into budgets 
 (r=-0.188, ns). 
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Structural model 
 
 Results of the empirical analysis of the structural model are reported in Figure 
2 and Table 3.11 
  
  Figure 2: Results of structural model with overall slack variable (standardized 
coefficients)
BU_PLAN/COM
R2=0.413
BU_PARTIC
BU_DETABIL
BU_EMPHASIS
PEU
BU_SLACK
R2=0.602
BU_COORD/ALL
R2=0.280
BU_EVAL/REW
R2=0.250
BU_SATISF
R2=0.347
-0.274**
-0.330**
-0.281**
0.313**
-0.049
-0.530** 0.173
-0.500**
0.293
0.210
-0.643**
  
  Table 3: Results of structural model (with overall and purposeful slack) 
 
 Overall slack 
 
Purposeful slack 
Paths (Stand.)coefficient 
(t-statistic)1 
(Stand.)coefficient 
(t-statistic)1 
BU_PARTIC          →  SLACK2 
BU_DETABIL       →  SLACK 
BU_EMPHASIS    →  SLACK 
PEU                        →  SLACK 
 
-0.274 (-2.118)** 
-0.330 (-2.471)** 
-0.281 (-2.324)** 
 0.313 ( 2.731)** 
-0.109 (-0.957) 
-0.234 (-1.792)* 
-0.174 (-1.128) 
-0.032 (-0.476) 
SLACK           →  BU_PLAN/COM 
SLACK           →  BU_COORD/ALL 
SLACK           →  BU_EVAL/REW 
 
-0.643 (-4.532)** 
-0.530 (-3.553)** 
-0.500 (-6.162)** 
 
-0.196 (-1.312) 
-0.402 (-2.990)** 
-0.309 (-1.776)* 
 
SLACK                   →  BU_SATISF 
BU_PLAN/COM    →  BU_SATISF 
BU_COORD/ALL  →  BU_SATISF 
BU_EVAL/REW    →  BU_SATISF 
 
-0.049 (-0.316) 
 0.293 ( 1.427) 
 0.173 ( 1.292) 
 0.210 ( 1.505) 
 
 0.016 ( 0.224) 
 0.312 ( 1.846)* 
 0.193 ( 1.451) 
 0.223 ( 1.654)* 
 
 1* and ** means significant at the 10% and 5% level (two-tailed). 
 2 In the second column, slack refers to overall slack (BU_SLACK), in the third          
  column slack  refers to purposeful slack (BU_PURPSLACK).  
 15 
 
 
 
 The four factors that influence the level of slack together explain 60% of its 
variance. The ability to detect slack (b=-0.330, t=-2.471), has the strongest 
impact12 on slack, followed by perceived environmental uncertainty  
 (b=0.313, t=2.731), budget emphasis (b=-0.281, t=-2.324) and budget 
participation  (b =-0.274, t=-2.118). The impact of detection ability and 
environmental uncertainty are both as expected and therefore provide 
supporting evidence on hypothesis 2 and 4. For budget participation, i.e., 
hypothesis 1, the argument that participation leads to information sharing and 
therefore to less slack seems to be stronger in our sample than the argument 
that participation leads to more opportunities for managers to increase slack. 
This result corroborates the findings of Merchant (1985) and Lal et al. (1995). 
For budget emphasis, i.e., hypothesis 3, consistent with Van der Stede (2001) 
and Webb (2002), we find that the incentive to create slack when the budget 
is important for a manager’s evaluation is less strong than the negative 
reputation effects when budgets are met each year. 
 The paths from the level of slack to the three purposes for which budgets can 
be used are all negative, suggesting that budgets with more slack are less fit 
for usage for the different purposes. This result provides empirical support for 
our hypothesis 5. The slack level has the strongest negative impact on using 
the budget for the planning/communication purpose (b=-0.643, t=-4.532), 
although the difference with the impact on the coordination/allocation 
 (b=-0.530, t=-3.553) and evaluation/rewarding (b=-0.500, t=-6.162) purposes, 
is small. 
 We find no evidence that use of the budget for the three purposes leads to 
higher budgeting system satisfaction. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is not 
supported. As shown earlier, the correlation matrix shows a strong negative 
relationship between the level of slack and budgeting system satisfaction. The 
PLS analysis, however, shows that the direct effect of budgetary slack on 
budgeting system satisfaction is, although again negative, only weak and not 
significant. This suggests that most of the effect of budgetary slack on 
satisfaction with the budgeting system is indirect and runs via the purposes of 
budget use, i.e., the impact of slack on satisfaction is mediated by the 
purposes of use. Decomposing the total effect of budgetary slack on 
budgeting system satisfaction (-0.433, t=-2.808) into the direct effect (-0.049) 
and the indirect effect via the purposes of budget use (-0.384), supports this 
conclusion. This despite the fact that none of the three relationships between 
the purposes of budget use and budgeting system satisfaction is significant. 
Together, these results provide no support for hypothesis 7, but do provide 
empirical support for our hypothesis 8. 
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Purposeful slack 
 
 When we re-analyze our model with the purposeful slack instead of the 
overall slack variable, results change drastically.13 These results are reported 
in Figure 3 and Table 3. 
 
Figure 3: Results of structural model with purposeful slack variable (standardized  
               coefficients) 
 
BU_PARTIC
BU_DETABIL
BU_EMPHASIS
PEU
BU_PURPSLACK
R2=0.178
BU_PLAN/COM
R2=0.038
BU_COORD/ALL
R2=0.161
BU_EVAL/REW
R2=0.096
BU_SATISF
R2=0.350
-0.109
-0.234*
-0.174
-0.032
0.016
-0.402** 0.193
-0.196
-0.309*
0.312*
0.223*
 
  
 First, most of the antecedents of slack become insignificant. Only ability to 
detect slack still has a significant negative impact on purposefully 
incorporating slack in the model (b=-0.234, t=-1.792). This suggests that 
traditional variables that influence slack do not work in a similar way for 
purposeful slack. This insight is supported by the low R2 of  the purposeful 
slack variable, which is only 0.178. Similarly, the impact of slack on the 
purposes of budget use are less strong, and only the impact of slack on the 
coordination/allocation (b=-0.402, t=-2.990) and evaluation/rewarding  
 (b=-0.309, t=-1.776) purposes, are still negatively significant. 
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V.  DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 In this paper we test a structural model about the impact of budgetary slack on 
the purposes for which budgets are used. First, we consider a number of 
factors that influence slack. Second, we argue that the level of slack 
negatively impacts the different purposes for which budgets are used. Finally, 
we examine the impact of the level of slack on budgeting system satisfaction, 
both directly and indirectly via the purposes of use. Our empirical analysis 
basically supports this model. We find that budget participation, ability to 
detect slack and budget emphasis are negatively and perceived environmental 
uncertainty positively related to overall slack. Slack is negatively related to 
the three purposes of budget use: planning/communication, 
coordination/allocation and evaluation/rewarding. Slack has no direct impact 
on budgeting system satisfaction, but does have an indirect impact via the 
purposes of use. Next to overall slack, we also estimated our model with 
purposeful slack. In this model, of the four antecedents only ability to detect 
slack is negatively related to purposeful slack. The impact of slack on the 
three purposes of budget use is weaker for this purposeful slack variable than 
for overall slack. Finally, there is still no direct impact of purposeful slack on 
budget system satisfaction, but only an indirect impact via the purposes of 
budget use. 
 Of the empirical results some merit further discussion. First, prior research 
has extensively analyzed factors that cause slack (see Dunk and Nouri, 1998, 
for an overview). Our results suggest that antecedents of slack might differ 
depending on whether slack is purposefully incorporated into budgets or not. 
Although beneficial effects of slack were recognized a long time ago, a 
distinction between these types of slack in theory building has not been made 
before. Therefore, a fruitful avenue for further research could be to analyze 
whether, and to what extent, such antecedents differ for different types of 
slack. We measure purposeful budgetary slack with a one-item instrument; 
therefore this literature stream would also benefit from developing 
measurement instruments that are better able to disentangle purposeful and 
overall slack. 
 Second, in our study we partly replicate the purposes of budget use of Hansen 
and Van der Stede (2004), and find an additional purpose. This reinforces 
Hansen and Van der Stede’s argument that their list of purposes is not 
comprehensive, nor is ours. Many variables can influence not only the 
intensity of use for different purposes, but also the types of budget use 
themselves. The level of analysis in our study is the corporate level and at that 
level resource allocation and authorizing spending are more important than at 
lower organizational levels. Further research could identify additional 
purposes of budget use and factors that are related to these purposes. 
 Third, we find that the slack level has a negative impact on all purposes of 
budget use. Merchant and Manzoni (1989) argue, in light of the contradictory 
guidelines for the optimal slack level for different purposes of budget usage, 
that firms have to make compromises in the use of their budgets or find other 
solutions to deal with this problem. One solution could, for example, be that 
firms rely on other control elements next to budgets for some of the purposes. 
Further, when it is difficult to specify an accurate budget target, performance 
evaluation could be based on subjective evaluations (Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2007). In our model we do not incorporate such alternative 
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mechanisms that firms might use. Further research could explore whether and 
how firms rely on such mechanisms for the purposes of use. 
 The results of this study should be interpreted in the light of its limitations. 
First, the sample of the study is rather small and although results of Partial 
Least Squares are quite robust to small samples, larger scale evidence to 
replicate these findings is needed.  Second, all traditional survey-related 
issues, such as the possibility of respondents to provide socially desirable 
answers, may apply. Third, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, we 
are unable to estimate causal relationships. Finally, we only examine the 
impact of slack on the different purposes of budget use, whereas Hansen and 
Van der Stede (2004) analyzed many factors that were related to budget use, 
such as the operating and external environment, and organization structure 
and strategy. We did not incorporate these variables in our models. 
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VII.  APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A:  
 
 
Measurement instruments used 
 
Budget participation (BU_PARTIC) 
To what extent do the managers of the business units in your firm participate 
in setting their unit’s targets? (1 = not at all, 5 = to a very great extent) 
 
Ability to detect slack (BU_DETABIL) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regard to the 
ability of the top management of your firm to detect slack in the budgets of 
the business units? (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
- Top management has enough information to know if there is slack in the 
 budgets of the business units 
- Top management receives detailed information on the operational 
 activities of the business units 
- Top management has a way to know if there is slack in the budgets of the 
 business units 
 
Budget emphasis (BU_EMPHASIS) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regard to the 
importance of meeting targets by the managers of the business units in your 
firm? (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
- Top management constantly reminds the managers of the business units 
 of the need to meet targets 
- Top management controls the business units chiefly by monitoring how 
 well performance meets targets 
- Promotion prospects of the managers of the business units depend 
 heavily on their ability to meet targets 
- In the eyes of top management, achieving targets is an accurate reflection 
 of whether the managers of the business units are succeeding 
 
Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) 
To what extent were the following factors that concern the external 
environment of your firm predictable during the past five years? (1 = very 
predictable, 5 = very unpredictable) 
- Suppliers’ actions 
- Customer demands, tastes and preferences 
- Deregulation and globalization 
- Market activities of competitors 
- Production technologies 
- Government regulations and policies 
- Economic environment 
- Industrial (workplace) relations 
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Budgetary slack (BU_SLACK) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regard to the 
role of targets in your budgeting system? (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree) 
- The managers of the business units succeed to submit budgets that are 
 easily  attainable 
- The targets induce high productivity in the business units – Reverse 
 coded 
- The targets require costs to be managed carefully in the business units – 
 Reverse coded 
- The targets have not caused the business units to be particularly 
 concerned with  improving efficiency 
 
How would you in general characterize the targets that are used in the 
preparation of the operational budgets in your firm? (1 = very easily 
attainable, 2 = attainable under normal circumstances, 3 = attainable with 
some extra effort, 4 = attainable with much extra effort, 5 = attainable only 
under ideal circumstances) – Reverse coded 
 
Purposeful slack (BU_PURPSLACK) 
Does top management in your firm sometimes consciously allow slack in the 
budgets of the business units? (1 = Never, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = Regularly, 4 = 
Often, 5 = Always) 
 
Budget purposes of use (BU_PURP) 
To what extent do operational budgets in your firm play a role for the 
following functions? (1 = not at all, 5 = to a very great extent) 
- Planning 
- Communication 
- Coordination of activities 
- Evaluation of activities 
- Motivation of managers 
- Evaluation of managers 
- Rewarding of managers 
- Allocating resources 
- Authorizing spending 
 
To what extent does the current operational budget support the strategy of 
your firm? (1 = not at all, 5 = to a very great extent) 
 
Budgeting system satisfaction (BU_SATISF) 
To what extent is the top management of your firm satisfied with the current 
budgeting system? (1 = very unsatisfied, 5 = very satisfied) 
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APPENDIX B:  
 
 
 
Results of factor analysis on theoretical constructs 14 
(based on  principal components analysis and varimax rotation). 
 
BU_DETABIL 
Items Factor loading 
Item1: Enough information to know if there is slack in the budgets 0.868 
Item2: Detailed information on the operational activities 0.772 
Item 3: A way to know if there is slack in the budgets 0.580 
Variance explained 56.2% 
 
BU_EMPHASIS 
Items Factor loading 
Item 1: Reminds the managers of the need to meet targets 0.800 
Item 2: Monitoring how well performance meets targets 0.729 
Item 3: Promotions prospects depend heavily on ability to meet targets 0.676 
Item 4: Achieving targets is an accurate reflection of succeeding 0.708 
Variance explained 53.2% 
 
BU_SLACK 
Items Factor loading 
Item 1: Succeed to submit budgets that are easily attainable 0.755 
Item 2: The targets induce high productivity 0.765 
Item 3: The targets require costs to be managed carefully 0.681 
Item 4: The targets have not caused concern with improving efficiency 0.623 
Item 5: How would you characterize the targets that are used? 0.571 
Variance explained 46.6% 
 
BU_PURP 
Items Factor1 Factor2 Factor 3 
Item 1: Planning   0.515 
Item 2: Communication   0.596 
Item 3: Coordination of activities  0.699  
Item 4: Evaluation of activities 0.715   
Item 5: Motivation of managers 0.725   
Item 6: Evaluation of managers 0.866   
Item 7: Rewarding of managers 0.595   
Item 8: Allocating resources  0.819  
Item 9: Authorizing spending  0.928  
Item 10: Budgeting-strategy link   0.813 
Variance explained 44.4% 12.3% 11.2% 
  
  
  
 
 
14 BU_PARTIC, BU_PURPSLACK, and BU_SATISF are not reported because they are 
one-item factors. PEU is not reported because it is a formative indicator 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
 
 
Loadings of the measurement model (multi-item instruments only)15 
 
Items loadings Composite reliability AVE 
BU_DETABIL 
Item 1 
Item 2 
Item 3  
 
0.900 
0.798 
0.473 
0.78 0.56 
    
BU_EMPHASIS 
Item 1 
Item 2 
Item 3 
Item 4 
 
0.796 
0.808 
0.639 
0.640 
0.81 0.53 
    
BU_SLACK  
Item 1 
Item 2 
Item 3 
Item 4 
Item 5 
 
0.745 
0.800 
0.703 
0.631 
0.471 
0.81 0.46 
    
BU_EVAL/REW 
Item 4 
Item 5 
Item 6 
Item 7 
 
0.766 
0.860 
0.866 
0.629 
0.86 0.62 
    
BU_COORD/ALL 
Item 3 
Item 8 
Item 9 
 
0.868 
0.940 
0.849 
0.92 0.79 
    
BU_PLAN/COM 
Item 1 
Item 2 
Item 10 
 
0.757 
0.768 
0.665 
0.78 0.54 
 
 
 
 
 
15
 Labels of the items are reported in appendix B. 
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VIII NOTES 
                                                
1
 According to Lukka (1988), slack can be divided in two parts. First, there is 
budgetary slack when the budget figure is intentionally made easier to achieve 
compared to management’s best guess. Second, there is an upward-bias in the 
budget figure when the expected performance is intentionally stated higher 
than management’s best guess. Otley (1985) refers, respectively, to positive 
slack and negative slack. In this paper we refer to a low slack level when the 
budget figure has negative slack or an upward-bias, and we refer to a high 
slack level when the budget figure has positive or, in Lukka’s terms, 
budgetary slack. Consistent with the papers of Van der Stede (2000, 2001), in 
our study the term budgetary slack incorporates both positive and negative 
slack. 
 
2Some argue that using the same budget for more than one purpose leads to 
conflicts (e.g., Epstein and Manzoni, 2002), whereas others argue that using 
budgets for multiple purposes leads to synergy (e.g., Fischer et al., 2002). 
 
3
 The budget should be linked closely to the followed firm strategy 
irrespective of the nature of the strategy, e.g., whether firms aim to be a cost 
leader or a differentiator. 
 
4
 As defined by Dunk and Nouri (1998), budgetary slack refers to the 
intentional underestimation of revenues and productive capabilities and/or 
overestimation of costs and resources required to complete a budgeted task. 
The exact nature of the budgeted target (i.e., whether it refers to revenues, 
costs, or profit) therefore depends on the kind of responsibility center used in 
the budgeted organizational units. As Merchant and Manzoni (1989) argue, 
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budgets in profit centers differ substantially from budgets in cost centers, 
because the environmental uncertainty has a much stronger impact on profit 
centers, profit centers can make more tradeoffs (increasing prices, cutting 
costs), and profit center managers are more likely to have a stronger link 
between budget targets and rewards. In a recent study using a very similar 
sample as ours, Schoute (2007) has found all firms to use either profit and/or 
investment centers. We therefore assume that the budgeted target in all (or 
almost all) our studied firms refers to profit. 
 
5
 The arguments underlying this hypothesis suggest that causality runs from 
budgetary slack to purposes of use. Other studies, however, suggest that 
causality between slack and purposes of use might be vice versa. For 
example, Fischer et al. (2002) argue that slack is low when budgets are used 
for both resource allocation and performance evaluation purposes, suggesting 
that causality runs from purposes of budget use to the slack level. We have a 
number of reasons why we believe that in our study causality runs from the 
level of slack to budget use. First, in their experiment Fischer et al. (2002) 
manipulate whether the budget will be used for resource allocation purposes 
or not. In our study, as the descriptives show, all firms use the budget for all 
studied purposes to at least some extent. Second, in their arguments, Fischer 
et al. (2002) mainly focus on the impact of budget use for performance 
evaluation and resource allocation on the budget proposals subordinates 
provide to top managers. In contrast, our dependent variable is the final slack 
level in the budget, thus after the proposals are revised by top management. 
Third, Fischer et al. (2002) perceive slack as purely negative and therefore 
slack should be minimized. In our study slack can either be negative or 
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beneficial, which implies that the slack level in our study also incorporates 
slack that is purposefully incorporated by top management. 
 
6
 Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) examine the impact of budget target 
difficulty on performance of each reason to budget, but do not estimate the 
impact of target difficulty on the reasons to budget. The construct 
“performance of each reason to budget” appears to imply that the factors 
examined, among others budget target difficulty, moderate the relationship 
between budget use and performance for that purpose. They find that budget 
target difficulty (the opposite of slack) negatively impacts the performance of 
the communication and strategy formation purposes, but has no influence on 
the performance of the operational planning and performance evaluation 
purposes. 
 
7
 Of all firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, only investment 
companies were left out of the study, as such firms have a different 
orientation with regard to operational budgeting. 
 
8
 A Mann-Whitney test indicated that the firms that responded were, on 
average, somewhat larger than those that did not respond (z=-2.324, p<0.02). 
A chi-square test indicated that the distribution of firms over three different 
sector categories, 1) manufacturing firms, 2) financial services firms, and 3) 
trade or (other) service firms, was similar among the firms that responded and 
those that did not respond (χ2=2.097, df=2, p>0.35). 
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9
 The rule of thumb in this kind of situation is that at least 10 observations per 
item should be available (Chin, 1998b). The PEU instrument has 8 items 
whereas we only have 44 observations. Analyzing the model with all 8 items 
modeled in a formative way in PLS, however, leads to qualitatively similar 
results as reported in this paper. 
 
10
 The distribution of our slack variable is similar to that of Van der Stede 
(2000, 2001). Based on the equally weighted average of the standardized item 
scores associated with each of the five items, the average and standard 
deviation of the variable are 0.00 and 0.68. Minimum and maximum values 
are -1.20 and +2.65. 
 
11
 As a robustness check, we also estimated an alternative model in which we 
added direct links between the four budgeting and environmental factors 
(BU_PARTIC, BU_DETABIL, BU_EMPHASIS and PEU) and the three 
purposes of budget use, to our structural model. All effects have the same 
direction, and all effects that are significant in our main analysis are also 
significant in this alternative analysis (although several at somewhat lower 
significance levels), showing our results to be highly robust to this alternative 
model specification. Two additional direct effects are found: budget 
participation is positively related to budget use for both 
coordination/allocation (p<0.05) and evaluation/rewarding (p<0.10) purposes. 
This suggests that participation does not only have an indirect effect on 
budget use for these two purposes (via budgetary slack), but also a direct 
effect. 
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12
 The reported b’s are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
13
 For this model we performed the same robustness check as for our overall 
slack model (see footnote 11). All effects again have the same direction in 
this alternative analysis, but the effects of BU_DETABIL on 
BU_PURPSLACK and of BU_PURPSLACK on BU_EVAL/REW are no 
longer significant (although the first is very close to being significant), 
showing our results to be reasonably robust to this alternative model 
specification. Four additional direct effects are found: consistent with the 
alternative overall slack model, budget participation is positively related to 
budget use for both coordination/allocation (p<0.05) and 
evaluation/rewarding (p<0.10) purposes. Also, ability to detect slack is 
positively and perceived environmental uncertainty is negatively related to 
budget use for the planning/communication purpose (p<0.05 and p<0.10, 
respectively). This suggests that when only the level of purposeful slack is 
controlled for in the model, ability to detect slack and perceived 
environmental uncertainty have a direct effect on budget use for this purpose. 
 
